When “hacktivists” graduate from DDoS to draining water tanks, your firewall isn’t enough.
Another day, another breach. While the French were busy worrying about their Christmas parcels during the La Poste outage, a much nastier game of shenanigans was unfolding in the background. We aren’t just talking about a website going dark because of a DDoS tantrum; we are talking about bad actors live streaming their access to water treatment SCADA systems. If you think your “secure” fortress is safe because you have a firewall and an air gap, I have a bridge in Brooklyn — or perhaps a water pump in Denmark — to sell you. The recent wave of pro-Russian hybrid warfare proves one thing: that fortress you built is likely made of plywood, and the wolves are already inside.
And, for much more details, I encourage you to read “Cyber Insight: Z-PENTEST ALLIANCE” from Cyber Intelligence Bureau
The Holiday Hangover: From Parcels to Pumps
Let’s dispel a myth right now: these attackers aren’t digital ninjas. If you’re picturing a sophisticated state-sponsored team burning million-dollar zero-day exploits to breach a fortress, stop. The reality is far more embarrassing. Groups like the Cyber Army of Russia Reborn and the Z-Pentest Alliance are essentially script kiddies playing with live ammunition. They aren’t picking the lock; they are just walking down the street checking every door handle until one opens.
Their primary weapon isn’t custom code; it is Shodan and password spraying. They scan for Operational Technology left naked on the internet — specifically exposed VNC connections that should never see the light of day. This is where the “Air Gap” fairy tale falls apart. You might believe your water pumps are isolated, but that integrator you hired five years ago likely punched a hole in your firewall for “remote maintenance convenience.” Now, that Human Machine Interface (HMI) is sitting there, waiting for anyone with a default password list to log in.
The recent CISA and FBI advisory hit the nail on the head: these actors possess “low level technical knowledge.” That makes them *more* dangerous, not less. A professional spy might steal data silently. These guys are blindly mashing buttons on a control panel they don’t understand. They intend to cause damage, but they cannot accurately anticipate the impact. When you let an amateur loose in a SCADA system, the **blast radius** isn’t just digital; it is physical pipes bursting and tanks overflowing because someone thought “admin/1234” was adequate defence for critical infrastructure.
Script Kiddies with Dangerous Toys
The recent joint advisory from CISA and the FBI hit the nail on the head, noting these actors possess “low level technical knowledge.” But ignorance is weaponised here. When you let a script kiddie access an HMI controlling hydraulic pressure, they don’t know if they are turning on a light or over-pressurizing a main. They are just clicking buttons to see what breaks. The blast radius of this incompetence is physical damage — overflowing tanks, burst pipes, and manual overrides that operators can’t reverse. It is, quite literally, Russian Roulette with critical infrastructure.
Stop Buying Plywood: A Real Defence Strategy
So, the script kiddies are rattling your doorknobs, and the standard industry response is to throw money at a bigger firewall or deploy a VPN. Let me be blunt: that is a dumpster fire of a strategy. A VPN is essentially just a very long Ethernet cable. It offers zero control over lateral movement. Once a bad actor breaches that perimeter — and they will, thanks to the password spraying we just discussed — they are inside your soft, chewy centre, free to roam from the corporate email server straight to the sludge pumps.
You need to stop relying on “security by obscurity” and start treating the internet like the hostile territory it is. The “air gap” is a lie we tell ourselves to sleep better at night. The answer isn’t more plywood; it is Zero Trust principles. Here is how you actually lock the door:
- Identity is the new perimeter: Implement strict Identity controls like Multi-factor Authentication and Single-Sign-On everywhere. Yes, even for Operational Technology. If you are relying on shared passwords or sticky notes on a monitor, you have already lost.
- Go invisible: Use an Identity-Aware Proxy to hide your infrastructure. If your HMI is visible to Shodan, you are painting a target on your back. Make your assets invisible to the public internet so scanning scripts find nothing but a black hole.
- Precise Authorisation: Stop connecting networks; connect users to resources. Enforce rules where User A can talk to Machine B, and absolutely nothing else. This limits the blast radius if a credential is stolen.
This is the essence of Defence-in-Depth. We need to move past the broken promise of the VPN. If you are drowning in vendor warnings and don’t know where to start, check out our guide on practical steps for protecting critical infrastructure. Stop buying plywood and build something that actually withstands the storm.
Conclusions
The attacks on La Poste and Danish utilities are a wake-up call, but are you hitting snooze? The barrier to entry for causing physical damage to critical infrastructure has dropped to the floor. These aren’t elite spies; they are opportunists walking through doors you left open. You can keep patching your VPNs and praying, or you can actually secure your identity perimeter. The choice is yours, but remember: when the water stops flowing, ‘we followed standard pre-cloud-ai-firewall-online procedure’ isn’t going to look good on the press release. Lock it down properly.