# Cyber Security Is Physical Safety: Lessons From a Thermal Runaway

- Link: https://www.agilicus.com/cyber-security-is-physical-safety-lessons-from-a-thermal-runaway/
- Published: 2026-05-17T02:32:31+00:00
- Author: Don Bowman

On Oct. 11, 2025, a fast-food restaurant in New Westminster, B.C., was evacuated
as toxic emissions and a raging fire consumed a nearby electric vehicle charging
station. The incident destroyed the unit, damaged adjacent infrastructure and serves
as a stark warning for the industrial sector. This was not a random equipment failure.
It was a cyber-physical event where software logic was allowed to override physical
reality.

## Anatomy of a Remote Error

According to Technical Safety BC report II-1977850-2025, the fire was caused by 
a human error during remote maintenance. A technician based in the United States
was performing diagnostics on the cooling system of a battery-integrated fast charger.
During this process, the technician inadvertently activated the battery heater instead
of the cooling fans.

In many systems, this would be a minor configuration error. However, the charger
was in a “diagnostic mode” that intentionally suppressed critical safety measures.
These safety protocols, designed to shut down the system if temperatures became 
unsafe, were effectively bypassed. For 26 hours, the battery heater ran continuously
while the safety systems remained silent. The battery temperature climbed to 82 
C, triggering a thermal runaway event.

## The Software Safety Trap

The incident highlights a dangerous trend in industrial design: the over-reliance
on software-based safety. We often treat software as a universal fail-safe, assuming
that a few lines of code can prevent disaster. But as this incident proves, software
is inherently malleable. It can be toggled off for testing, bypassed by diagnostic
modes or subverted by malicious actors.

If a well-meaning technician can accidentally bypass safety protocols and cause 
a fire, imagine what a motivated attacker could achieve. We are entering an era 
where malware can be a kinetic weapon. A malicious actor with access to a remote
gateway could activate heaters across a regional network of chargers or override
pressure valves in a gas distribution system. When code controls the physical world,
a software vulnerability becomes a public safety hazard.

## The Pragmatic Solution: Hardware Interlocks

To move toward true cyber resilience, we must return to a fundamental engineering
principle: critical safety limits must be enforced by local hardware.

If a software failure or an administrative override can lead to a fire or explosion,
that system is fundamentally insecure. Physical “limit switches” and hardware-based
thermal cut-offs must exist outside the reach of any software diagnostic mode. These
interlocks should be impossible to override remotely, ensuring that no matter what
happens at the control layer, the physical equipment remains within its safe operating
envelope.

## Securing the Remote Gateway

Remote maintenance is a necessity for modern infrastructure, but it requires a more
robust approach than simply lowering the shields. The reliance on “silent email 
alerts” observed in the New Westminster incident is a failure of communication and
accountability.

Instead of broad diagnostic modes that suppress safety, organisations need strong,
identity-based safeguards. Every remote session should be governed by a zero trust
architecture that validates the user’s identity and restricts their actions to the
bare minimum required for the task.

 * **Unified Authentication:** Technicians should use their native corporate credentials
   through single sign-on. This ensures that access is automatically revoked when
   a technician leaves their role.
 * **Precise Authorisation:** Access should be granular. A technician diagnosing
   an HVAC system should not have the ability to override battery thermal protections.
 * **Real-Time Accountability:** Critical alerts must be more than silent emails.
   They require immediate, identity-verified acknowledgement and escalation.

## Conclusion: A New Security Mandate

Cyber security is no longer just about protecting data or preventing downtime; it
is about physical safety. The fire in New Westminster is a call to action for every
industrial operator. It is time to audit our systems for software-only safety traps
and re-implement the hardware interlocks that keep our communities safe.

Don’t let code be the only thing between your infrastructure and a thermal runaway.
True safety starts when the software stops and the hardware takes over.